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GROWING UP AMID THE RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
AFFAIR: A PERSPECTIVE FROM INDOLOGY 
by Thomas B. Ellis 
 
Abstract. This article identifies the tropes of “maturity” and 
“immaturity” in the dialogue between religion and science. On 
both sides of the aisle, authors charge, either directly or indirectly, 
that their dissenting interlocutors are not mature enough to see the 
value of their respective positions. Such accusations have recently 
emerged in discussions pertaining to Hindu theology, Indology, and 
science. Those who dismiss the substance dualism of Hindu yoga, 
according to Jonathan B. Edelmann, evince immaturity. Appeals to 
Hindu yoga are yet one more appeal to religious experience. Indeed, 
what we find in Edelmann’s text is an appeal to appreciate the 
private, unverifiable—or falsifiable, for that matter—“insights” of 
Hindu yogis. Yogic experience is interminably steeped in motivated 
perception and confirmation bias. There is simply no good evidence 
or rational argument to take yogic claims seriously. Insofar as that 
is the case, Indology must achieve consilience with the natural and 




Accusations of immaturity occasionally animate the discussion pertaining 
to the compatibility, or not, of religion and science. Perhaps the most 
memorable of such accusations belongs to Sigmund Freud. Freud (1927) 
characterized religion as infantile insofar as it encourages adults to redeploy
 
strategies children use to handle hardship and heartache. As children turn 
to their parents for solace, so too religious adults project a parent-like figure 
into the cosmos in hopes that the figure will similarly provide solace. Failing 
to recognize that religion is the result of a wish fulfillment perpetuates 
immaturity. Freud suggested that we needed to grow up and that a scientific 
education to reality was the ticket to such maturation. Science supposedly 
tempers our infantile proclivities. 
While it is the infantile strategy of turning to divine parents that explicitly 
informs Freud’s perspective on religion, I believe we ought to take note of 
the complementary argument in his text. Freud suggests that we ought to 
beware of allowing what we would like to be the case to inform what we 
believe is actually the case. If our worldview just so happens to corroborate 
what we would like to believe, then we ought to pause for a moment of 
critical reflection. It is, of course, possible that what we want to be true is in 
fact true, but as the recent debates concerning science and religion testify, 
this is clearly not the case for everyone. I argue that intellectual maturity 
demands that we accept what is the case and by so doing dispose of wishful 
thinking in the toy chest of childhood. 
The latest accusation of immaturity I have come across is in Jonathan 
B. Edelmann’s Hindu Theology and Biology: The Bhāgavata Purān. a and 
Contemporary Theory. Edelmann suggests that there exists at present a 
certain popular interest in painting with broad strokes the incompatibilities 
between science and religion, and, what is more, either an implicit or 
explicit prescription to do away with religion altogether. This is a position 
of immaturity for Edelmann. Popular (mis)understandings of religion 
and science apparently result from nothing more than “‘mythologized’ 
distinctions” (2012, 22). According to Edelmann, it would appear that the 
time is nigh for a “mature mind” to see beyond such putatively facile and, 
one should infer, immature characterizations. Religion’s detractors simply 
fail to engage with maturity religion’s perspective. Edelmann writes, “A 
true and genuine dialogue does not occur between texts, but between 
people who have, to use  an  Indian  theme,  ‘seen’  the  texts;  that  is, 
they have assimilated and understood the texts through sustained and 
critical reflection with a mature mind ” (2012, 22–23, emphasis added). 
Edelmann stands not alone in such a charge. Many theologians today are 
indeed often wont to characterize their scientific detractors as being too 
simpleminded with regard to the supposed subtleties of theology (Haught 
2008). I disagree. Failing to understand and/or assimilate the subtleties 
of theological texts may not be the actual reason why scientific detractors 
dismiss religion. 
Despite Edelmann’s initial characterization, there is nothing uniquely 
Indian about using the trope of vision to express comprehension. We in “the 
West” routinely use such language. Surely it is not uncommon for someone 
to say, “I see what you mean,” once the point in question is understood. 
 
 
Comprehension is not what makes “seen” a particularly “Indian theme.” I 
am, in this regard, a bit suspicious that Edelmann’s initial characterization 
is tendentious. Let us be clear about this particular Indian theme. 
The “Indian theme” of “seen” is not simply a matter of “assimilation” 
and “understanding,” insofar as these words do not necessarily mean 
that one has acquired some “experiential knowledge.” For instance, I 
believe I can thoroughly comprehend the dualistic philosophy of Sām. kya- 
Yoga without having to practice yoga or have some yogic experience. To 
claim otherwise—standard practice for phenomenologists and theologians 
alike—is to invite all of the rationally and empirically warranted criticism 
that has been leveled at the phenomenology of religion over the past few 
decades (Fitzgerald 2000; Wiebe 2000; McCutcheon 2001; Segal 1983). 
But that is precisely what is “unique” about the Indian use of “seen.” 
The “Indian theme” pertains to some sort of knowledge gained via the 
practice and ultimately experience of devotional yoga. In this regard, “yogic- 
perception,” as I so call it, would seem to be an Indian euphemism for 
“experience,” a term itself hotly contested in the academic study of religion 
(Taves 2009). Vaishnava theology, at least as Edelmann presents it, appears 
to be a systematic elaboration of, if not in fact apology for metaphysical and 
epistemological claims based on what is rightfully taken to be “religious 
experience”; after all, “theology is largely devoted to making sense of and 
bringing some logical order to the claims of popular religion” (McCauley 
2011, 228). Immaturity, according to Edelmann’s account, would thus 
seem to connote stubborn skepticism regarding such claims. 
Recognizing that Edelmann does not directly attribute “immaturity” to 
any one thinker, or popularizer as the case may be, we can all the same gather 
from a footnote on page 12 that he has at least associated such immaturity 
with the likes of Daniel Dennett (2006), Richard Dawkins (2006), and 
Sam Harris (2007). Of course, according to his implied definition of 
maturity, Edelmann would be right. Dennett, Dawkins, and Harris are 
disinclined to accept the claims of religious devotees, especially when they 
are so clearly out of keeping with the results of research in the natural and 
human sciences: “Today’s sciences of the mind cast doubt on metaphysical 
intuitions” (Edis 2008, 124). 
Hindu theology, not to mention the various traditions often referred to 
monolithically and thus problematically as “Hinduism” (Flood 1996), is 
incompatible with contemporary science. This point is well demonstrated 
in C. Mackenzie Brown’s Hindu Perspectives on Evolution: Darwin, Dharma, 
and Design (2012). Brown documents not only the history of classical 
and contemporary Hindu metaphysics and epistemology but also the 
incompatibility of such Hindu traditions with regard to contemporary 
science. The fact of the matter is that contemporary scientific methods and 
results indirectly support a particular metaphysic as well as epistemology 
that are at odds with Hindu theology and religion, generally conceived. 
 
 
Brown and Edelmann, of course, disagree. Edelmann suggests that a 
dialogue is possible between, specifically,  the  biological  sciences  and 
the theology of the Bhāgavata Purān. a. I remain unconvinced. Brown’s 
conclusions, on the other hand, indicate perhaps unsurprisingly that the 
Hindu traditions are no more compatible with science, broadly construed, 
than are Christianity and Islam. I agree with Brown. 
In what follows, I will indicate where I believe the Hindu traditions and 
theologies run afoul of not only well-tested, scientific methods but also the 
resulting truth claims concerning what is real and what is not. Moreover, I 
will show that Hindu traditions routinely “discover” exactly what most 
human animals hope to be the case. In this regard, I believe Hindu 
traditions are routinely guilty of motivated perception and confirmation 
bias. While Freud would certainly chalk up such failures in reasoning to 
emotional needs—a theme itself dating as far back as Lucretius—recent 
work in the cognitive sciences demonstrates that there may be something 
more to religion’s appeal than merely emotional satisfaction (McCauley 
2011). Religion in all its guises may be the result of an emotionally 
satisfying, yet all the same cognitive, mistake. Perhaps it is the widespread 
proclivity to indulge this mistake that must be outgrown if we are to assess 
with any modicum of maturity the contributions of science and religion— 
including Hindu traditions, of course—to an accurate understanding of 
ourselves, the world, and ultimately the universe. Likewise, and with respect 
to Indology, it would appear that many in the field, especially those 
interested in the religious and philosophical traditions of India, appear 
all-too-ready to allow unsupported claims emanating from the various 
yoga and dharma traditions to influence not only their own methods but 
also their metaphysics (Inden 1990). I propose that Indology must move 
beyond sympathetic translations and romantic apologetics and pursue an 
explanation of the dharma traditions that is consilient with the rest of the 
natural and human sciences (Ellis 2009, 2011; Wilson 1998). 
The worldview currently enjoying scientific support and consensus is 
naturalism. “Naturalism” is for all intents and purposes interchangeable 
with “physicalism” and “materialism.” The particle physicist Victor Stenger 
rightly notes, “According to our best current knowledge, the substance 
of the universe is matter and nothing else. So, until something other 
than matter is discovered, always at least a remote possibility, we can 
equate naturalism with materialism” (2009, 160). While its metaphysic 
is materialism, naturalism’s epistemology is empirico-rationalism (Avalos 
2005), meaning that what is considered true is that for which there is good 
empirical evidence and rational argument. 
Concerning god(s), naturalism generally adopts a position of strong 
agnosticism (Ellis 2008). Strong agnostics, to be sure, function as atheists. 
They argue that no human animal can make any pronouncements 
whatsoever concerning supernatural entities, even though such entities 
 
 
may exist. In which case, all supernatural pronouncements are merely 
the products of human fancy. Appeals to private intuitions or revelations 
simply won’t do. On the issue of a soul or mind being capable of existing 
outside of a physical medium, naturalism is rightfully atheistic. As we will 
see following, consciousness is the emergent property of a highly complex, 
physical system. 
Naturalism is not the metaphysics and epistemology most people 
fancifully choose (Pyszczynski et al. 2003). Rather, it would seem to 
force itself upon the mature thinker as the result of abductive reasoning. 
Despite theistic accusations to the contrary, naturalism is “neither the 
a priori premise nor the logically necessary conclusion of methodological 
naturalism, but the well-grounded a posteriori result” (Forrest 2000, 19). 
Owen Flanagan similarly notes: 
Supernatural concepts have no philosophical warrant. Furthermore, it is not just 
that such concepts are displaced only if we accept, from the start, a naturalistic 
or scientific vision of things. There simply are no good arguments—theological, 
philosophical, humanistic, or scientific—for beliefs in divine beings, miracles, or 
heavenly afterlives. (2002, xiii) 
I agree. Religion simply fails to present any good evidence or argument for 
its various claims (Baggini 2003). Insofar as this is the case—and I believe it 
to be the case—religion’s methods and claims, including of course those of 
the Hindu traditions, are incompatible with science’s methods and claims. 
When the claims are truly incompatible, maturity counsels adopting the 
latter’s. Many have and will disagree. 
Over much of the twentieth century, the status of scientific methods 
and claims came under sustained scrutiny. Disciplines such as the history 
and sociology of science as well as the philosophy of science, for instance, 
often found it plausible to problematize scientific pursuits and results. To 
discuss what is actually true began to sound a bit naive, and by extension 
perhaps a bit immature. Science studies, generally conceived, seemed to 
support postmodern antirealism. For postmodernists, truth claims were 
increasingly considered the output of unrecognized and/or undetected 
ideologies. Science simply found what it presupposed. Thomas S. Kuhn 
(1962) (in)famously argued that all sciences operate within some paradigm 
and it is only in light of such paradigms that knowledge claims make any 
sense. The crucial implication of such a position was that the paradigms 
themselves were not and are not the result of scientific discovery. Paradigms 
would seem to be relative and/or subjective. For many, relativizing science in 
this way ostensibly counsels the democratic appeal to be open to alternative 
epistemologies and by extension metaphysics. 
In her 2002 presidential address to the American Academy of Religion, 
Vasudha Narayanan adopts just such an antiscience position. She endorses 
openness to “epistemic diversity” and “corporeal knowledge.” Highlighting 
its putatively ideological bent, Narayanan aligns contemporary science 
 
 
with cultural imperialism, appealing thereby to her audience’s postcolonial 
sensibilities, if not in fact guilt. I concur with Donald Wiebe when he notes, 
“It appears, however, that the alternative sources of knowledge she proposes 
be taken seriously by the academy are essentially religious in character, 
involving the adoption of particular cosmological and metaphysical world 
views” (2006, 685). That is indeed the point. We must adopt a priori 
a different paradigm in order to recognize the contributions of various 
religious perspectives. Insofar as such a recommendation relies upon a 
postmodern relativistic stance, I must agree further with Wiebe when he 
notes that such relativism “has ‘bought’ the argument of the postmodernists 
to the effect that reason and scientific thought are themselves essentially 
ideological. That argument, however, is simply not persuasive” (Wiebe 
2006, 688; see also Koertge 1998; Gross and Levitt 1994). Not only 
is it unpersuasive to scientific students of religion, but it is, curiously 
enough, equally unpersuasive to those marginalized worldviews that would 
ostensibly benefit from the adoption of such. To be sure, the overwhelming 
majority of Indian traditions are committed not to relativism but rather a 
robust correspondence theory of truth (Franco 1987). I do not believe it 
is such a stretch to claim that religious communities generally believe that 
what they believe is actually true (Segal 1983; Haught 2008). 
Edelmann apparently senses the failure of the relativizing strategy. His 
approach attempts to show that Vaishnava theology is consistent with 
the best practices of mainstream science. Edelmann points out that both 
appeal to perception, inference, and authoritative testimony. Although 
science is often wont to deny its reliance on testimony—that is, authority— 
Edelmann is right to note such reliance. Science could not in fact exist 
without authoritative testimony. Scientists simply do not reinvent the 
wheel every time they enter the laboratory. Insofar as that is the case, 
scientists must rely on the discoveries of past scientists in order to move 
their respective fields forward. That being said, scientists are surely most 
cautious when it comes to relying on testimony. Not just any claim will do. 
Authoritative testimony in science is predicated upon successful peer 
review. Peer review establishes the value of any scientific claim because it 
presumably forestalls the pernicious epistemological problems of motivated 
perception and confirmation bias. As the renowned physicist Richard P. 
Feynman correctly noted, we must be careful not to fool ourselves because 
fooling ourselves is the easiest thing to do. So much so is this the case 
that it has led Michael Shermer to posit that our default position is one of 
“belief-dependent realism” (2011, 5). We allow our preconceived beliefs 
to inform how we interpret the world, only grudgingly ceding such beliefs 
upon the presentation of robust evidence and argument to the contrary. 
Edelmann seemingly makes a similar argument for the Hindu traditions. 
He suggests that Hindu claims to truth are likewise based on authoritative 
testimony and peer review. I am unconvinced that this is the case. The 
 
 
similarity between scientific and Hindu testimony and peer review may be 
more impressionistic than substantive. 
I argue that Hindu traditions, like all religious traditions, are replete 
with motivated perceptions and confirmation biases. I further argue that 
religious practitioners seldom, if ever, attempt to disconfirm their positions. 
With respect to devotional yoga, I am equally unconvinced that there is 
any way to peer review what are in effect experiences deemed yogic (Taves 
2009). The so-called community of peers that vet Vaishnava claims—that 
is, the “sanga” (Edelmann 2012, 168)—rely on a most suspicious method 
for establishing authority: 
One should first gain knowledge about canonical texts; then one should put that 
knowledge into practice by carrying out the various forms of devotional practices 
described in the Bhāgavata; and after time “knowledge about” the texts will become 
“knowledge of” the texts, if one properly performs the practice. . . . The text also 
says that by religious practice one can see Visnu in the heart; this latter claim 
is only open to verification or falsification by practitioners. (Edelmann 2012, 
115) 
This method seems imminently committed not to warranted skepticism 
but to unabashed motivated perception and confirmation bias. To be sure, 
one is to read the texts that make the claims. One is to engage in devotional 
practices—for example, meditation and yoga—that concentrate on the 
entities and realities proclaimed in the texts. Then, with diligence, one 
perceives what one was told one would perceive: “In Vaishnava thought 
there exists the idea that when a practitioner hears the testimony of the 
Bhāgavata and when they practice what they have heard, they will then have 
direct experience of the objects of which the Bhāgavata speaks” (Edelmann 
2012, 170). To me, this walks and talks like motivated perception and 
confirmation bias, and it raises yet another difficulty. 
As I hinted above, equally problematic is the fact that at no point in 
Edelmann’s presentation of the similarities between Hindu theology and 
biology do we ever get the sense of what would falsify yogic perception. 
For evolutionary biology, falsification would be quite simple: a rabbit 
in the pre-Cambrian fossil record would do the trick. This is a curious 
omission on Edelmann’s part insofar as such falsification is a standard of 
contemporary scientific practice. Indeed, how can one falsify a claim issuing 
from “phenomenological subjectivity”(Edelmann 2012, 89)? I argue that 
yogic perception is simply incapable of being falsified, or verified for that 
matter. Edelmann’s appeal to Vaishnava peer review is unpersuasive. There 
is simply no guarantee that the yogic consensus is not manufactured post 
hoc. Truly, “variability in cultural representations is inescapable. . . . The 
accurate reproduction of mental representations is the rare exception in 
the transmission of ideas, even with the cultural scaffolding that texts can 
supply”(McCauley 2011, 241). We simply cannot be sure that what one 
yogi experiences is the same as that of another. In which case, it would seem 
 
 
terribly dubious to hang one’s metaphysic on the claims of like-minded 
and like-motivated religious practitioners. 
When scientists rest on the testimony of others, they have faith that the 
authoritative claims are about external, mind-independent realities. These 
realities are gotten to not by closing one’s eyes and attempting to block 
out external, perceptual input—standard practice for many meditation 
strategies—but rather by engaging in experiments open to one and all to 
inspect, criticize, and ultimately replicate: 
 
Science does not tolerate secret formulas, special sensitivities, or so-called 
singularities. . . . The steadfastness with which the scientific community demands 
the public availability of scientific claims and the replicability of scientific findings 
are the two most important pillars on which scientific methods’ epistemic 
credibility rests. (McCauley 2011, 142) 
It would seem to be the exact opposite for bhakti yoga. Yogic perception 
is exhaustively mind-dependent, internally generated, and wholly private. 
Through deep contemplation and meditation, the yogi claims to have 
contact with a reality that is beyond the reach of our everyday sense 
perceptions. By turning inward we supposedly come to know what is truly 
outward. I must admit that it seems more plausible and probable that 
yogis mistake internally generated brain states with extra-mental reality. 
For good or ill, I remain wholly unconvinced that the deafferentation of 
the right superior parietal lobe (Newberg et al. 2001) or micro-seizures in 
the temporal lobe (Persinger 1987) lend any insight whatsoever to what is 
actually true about us, the world, and/or universe. It is indeed “hard to see 
how by using less of our brains we can learn more about the universe, so this 
experience is most likely all in our heads” (Stenger 2009, 220). I believe 
Pascal Boyer is right to argue that there is something “deeply—I would say 
criminally—ambiguous” (2010, 63) about noting the neurological reality of 
such experiences, precisely because it would seem to intimate immediately 
that this neurological event corresponds with reality as such. 
Although it may ultimately be only in degree, the difference between 
Edelmann’s sense of yogic testimony and putative peer review and what 
actually takes place in scientific circles might as well be one in kind. 
Truly, in the absence of publicly reviewable evidence, yogic testimony is 
nothing more than anecdote. Accumulating anecdotes does not amount to 
accumulating data. Comparing anecdotes does not amount to peer review. 
Willfully consenting to anecdotes that confirm what you wish to be the 
case does not establish authority, and it is indeed the case that what the 
bhakti yogi experiences is exactly what his or her existentially troubled soul 
would wish to discover all along. 
While it is true that dispassion is often counseled in the Hindu traditions, 
this should not be taken to mean, as Edelmann seemingly presents it, that 
the devotees are bereft of personal investment in their practices. He writes, 
 
 
“The idea in the Bhāgavata (is) that detachment and dispassion are required 
to understand reality as it really is rather than as one would like it to be” 
(2012, 187) noting elsewhere, “Theology. . . is possible only when the 
reader is willing to set aside his or her personal hopes and wishes about 
the nature of reality (material and spiritual) and the meaning of the text, 
and is thereby ready to receive the text rather than impose a preconception 
on it” (2012, 185). I simply disagree. In fact, I propose that it is the exact 
opposite for the Hindu traditions, a point Edelmann’s text itself seems to 
corroborate. He writes, “To be a good bhakti-yogin it is necessary to put 
aside one’s hopes and wishes regarding the erroneous concept of the body 
as self, and the notion that the world is something that can be enjoyed 
independent of God” (2012, 161). We will examine in a moment just 
how “erroneous” this “concept” is from the scientific perspective. For now, 
I have to insist that the “erroneous concept” is not what the majority of 
Hindu Indians—not to mention most religious peoples (Flanagan 2002)— 
hope is the case. The consistent marginalization, if not in fact outright 
disparagement of the Cārvaka system in India, clearly bears this out (Brown 
2012). 
Bhakti yogis often begin their search for truth with a very specific 
motivation: they are disgusted with the embodied, biological condition. 
This is amply borne out in the South Asian philosophical and religious 
literature (Masson 1976, 1980; Ellis 2011). Edelmann himself indicates 
as much: “The knowledge that leads one to renunciation and detachment 
from embodied life is often called vāiragya-jñāna” (2012, 196). Though 
amenable to various translations, vāiragya can clearly be associated with 
disgust. Elsewhere he writes, “The characteristics of the self are described 
in [Bhāgavata] 7.7.29 to help a grieving mother understand the difference 
between matter and self, which is supposed to help free her from suffering” 
(2012, 67). The practice of devotional yoga is anything but dispassionate 
and unmotivated, despite what the texts themselves may occasionally 
suggest. I argue that religious practitioners are not engaging in their 
practices to find out what reality is in itself, but rather precisely for 
how it relates to their particular predicaments and ultimately their so- 
called enlightenment. Edelmann cites the Sām. khya-kārikā 64: “From 
the study of the constituents of nature, the salvation-knowledge arises, 
‘I am not matter’” (2012, 141, fn. 12). Bhakti yogis find exactly what 
they hope is the case—that is, that the self is not limited to the mortal 
body and, at least for the Vaishnava traditions, that Vishnu is in control 
of all. 
Far from being dispassionate, bhakti yogis want something more than 
the algorithmic machinations of an insentient universe. They want to 
believe that consciousness is more than an emergent property of an 
exhaustively material system. This is precisely where the scientific and 
Hindu communities  become  irreconcilable.  From cosmology  (Krauss 
 
 
2012) to evolutionary development biology (Carroll 2006), the picture 
that is coming into focus is one that maintains that the universe and what 
little life there is therein are products of mindless, impersonal algorithms 
(Dennett 1995). It is this exhaustive physicalism that leads Flanagan (2007) 
to suggest that the really hard problem today is not an explanation of the 
physical origins of consciousness but rather the ability to find meaning in 
a seemingly metaphysically meaningless world. I dare say that Flanagan’s 
perspective is not something he came to out of a desire for it to be true. In 
fact, he recognizes that “existential horror and unremitting nausea” (2002, 
11) are probably the first responses to the contemporary scientific image. 
Emotional discomfort, however, ought not to inform our metaphysics. We, 
including Vaishnavas, ought not to fool ourselves. 
While there are plenty of facts that one could, and ought to, consult 
when establishing a worldview by which one may then organize one’s 
beliefs and behaviors, there are two topics that are of utmost concern 
when it comes to the discussion of science and religion generally, and 
on Edelmann’s and Brown’s recent accounts, the discussion of Hindu 
theology and science in particular—cosmogony and consciousness. These 
two topics are unsurprisingly central insofar as they appear to be the 
domains of final retreat for the God-(or Brahma)-of-the-gaps argument. 
Truly, the “irreducible complexity” and “complex specified information” 
arguments have met their matches (Young and Edis 2004). Accordingly, a 
good bit of theological energy is spent today arguing that consciousness is 
not reducible to its physical medium and that the universe as a whole calls 
out for an intelligent creator. These are admittedly hard problems, but I 
am unconvinced that they are intractable, or at least so intractable as to 
render all logical possibilities equally probable. 
Was the universe intelligently created? Did the universe create itself? Was 
the so-called “Big Bang” a singular event or was it merely one episode among 
a potentially infinite number of such episodes occurring both serially and in 
parallel? These are the questions currently exercising the cosmologists. Have 
they been definitively settled once and for all? Of course not. That being 
said, I believe we can recognize that there are viable natural, mathematical 
models that indicate the universe in which we find ourselves is not as unique 
as a classical creationist may want to suggest. Inasmuch as the jury is not 
exhaustively in on this score, there remains the possibility of an intelligent 
creator, whether that creator is the god of the Abrahamic faiths or Vishnu of 
the Hindu, or some other entity that simply escapes our imagination. There 
is simply no way of knowing which, if any, such agencies are responsible 
for the universe, or multiverse, as the case plausibly is. The best we can do 
on this score is claim agnosticism. No religious authority can claim with 
any certainty anything certain about cosmogony or cosmology. What is 
certain, though, is that Hindu thinkers, both classical and contemporary, 
maintain insistently that an intelligent being must be involved from the 
 
 
beginning, either as a complement to or facilitator of the physical (Brown 
2012). This is not the consensus of the cosmologists. 
What theists generally tend to claim about the creation of the universe 
hangs on their position regarding the other of the two “hot button” 
issues animating the religion and science discussion—consciousness. In 
much the same way that the universe’s origins remain uncertain—a point 
even R. gVeda 10.129 seems to acknowledge, despite Dayananda Saraswati’s 
indications to the contrary—many believe that the origins and nature 
of consciousness are themselves similarly inscrutable. Unfortunately, such 
seeming inscrutability supports a wide variety of rationally unwarranted 
speculation. 
Perhaps the most popular speculation concerning consciousness pertains 
to substance dualism. Substance dualism holds that there are two 
fundamental elements or substances in reality. We find such dualisms 
in both Western and Eastern traditions. René Descartes, of course, is the 
most famous Western dualist. Descartes held that there are things that are 
extended in space and time (res extensa) and things that are not (res cogitans). 
The latter things enjoy the ability to know, reflect, and intend—that is, 
they enjoy sentience. Of course, Descartes ran into the trouble—as do all 
substance dualists—of how the two spheres interact. The Hindu dualists 
apparently skirt this problem by proclaiming that such interaction, though 
phenomenologically compelling, may be a mistake. 
The most famous Hindu dualist would have to be Patañjali. Endorsing 
the Sām. kya system of philosophy, Patañjali argued that there are indeed two 
general ontological categories—that is, puru.sa and prak.rti. puru.sa is often 
understood to be a timeless and infinite source of consciousness. prak.rti 
on the other hand is the material stuff of brute reality. Significantly for 
the present discussion, Sām. kya philosophy holds that mind (manas) and 
intelligence (buddhi) are actually part of the material nature that is prak.rti. 
Edelman seems to suggest that this dissipates the mind-body problem for 
Hindus. It does and it doesn’t. 
There is no manas-deha (mind-body) problem for Patañjali insofar 
as both are considered elements of prak.rti. However, there would seem 
to be the functionally equivalent cit-manas/deha problem. How indeed 
do puru.sa and prak.rti interact? Patañjali gets out of this functionally 
equivalent conundrum by arguing that consciousness does not interact 
with the mind-body complex. In fact, suffering comes precisely from falsely 
believing there is such interaction (cf. Yoga Såtra 2, 17). Edelmann uses 
this position as a means of blunting the physicalism currently enjoying a 
growing consensus amid the mind sciences. He writes, “Reconciliation is 
possible because the Bhāgavata posits three ontological categories: physical 
matter, the mind, and consciousness” (2012, 218). Accordingly, all of the 
research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) simply addresses 
realities pertinent to prak.rti and as such has no comment on fundamental 
 
 
consciousness—that is, puru.sa. The trouble with this position, however, 
is that not only is there no reason or evidence to believe that substance 
dualism is true, but there is absolutely no evidence or reason to posit 
the ontologically gratuitous three categories of the Vaishnava system. 
Edelmann disagrees. 
It would appear at one point that Edelmann justifies the Vaishnava 
position by appealing to the work of Indologists. He writes, “Indologists 
have explored the notion of this non-sensual and non-physical perception, 
or the visions of those whose ‘doors of the mind may be opened’ (R. g 
9.10.6; cf. R. g 4.11.2; quoted in Gonda 1963, 17)” (2012, 109). Believing 
rightly or wrongly that my training in Sanskrit and Indian philosophy 
allows me to speak as an Indologist, I will be the first to admit that my 
command of ancient Sanskrit texts that wax romantic about all sorts of 
special powers and insights does not constitute me as an authority on what 
consciousness actually is. It reminds me of a charge against one of William 
Lane Craig’s favorite reasons for accepting the so-called evidence for the 
resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth: the majority of New Testament scholars 
attest to it. The majority of New Testament scholars attest to the evidence 
of the resurrection because they already believe in the resurrection. There 
is no evidence for such a miraculous event. Anecdotally speaking, many 
Indologists I know are equally romantic about the fantastic claims of yogis 
and fakirs. Skepticism regarding indigenous evidence and justifications 
does not seem to be part of Indological training. In this regard, consider 
some of the evidence Edelmann marshals for defending three ontological 
categories: “The way consciousness identifies with mind-brain relationships 
is analogous to the manner in which a dreamer identifies with a dream” 
(2012, 219); “Just as in a dream one falsely believes one has a connection 
with the dream” (2012, 121); “A dream has no intrinsic relationship with 
the life of the dreamer” (2012, 125). The third ontological category—that 
is, puru.sa—is ostensibly supported by an analogy with dreaming; however, 
the claim that a dream has nothing to do with the dreamer is unsupported. 
In fact, there are compelling reasons to think otherwise. For instance, threat 
simulation theory (TST) posits that one’s dreams provide a safe “arena” in 
which to practice and thus hone evasion tactics that facilitate the survival 
of the dreamer when awake and actually experiencing threats to his or 
her well-being (Revonsuo 2000). According to TST, the dreamer and the 
dream are in effect one and the same. It is simply untrue that there is 
an obvious disconnect between dreamer and dream, and yet that is the 
argument many Hindu texts apparently make. 
Edelmann also appeals  to phenomenological awareness  to support 
Vaishnavism’s “ontologically queer substances” (Flanagan 2007, 86). He 
notes, “The movement from one state of consciousness to another, while 
retaining a sense of individuality and continuity, is taken as evidence 
that the self/consciousness is different from the mind-body complex” 
(2012, 69). Again, this is clearly not the only way to handle first-person 
 
 
phenomenal awareness. In fact, the Buddhist traditions take the same 
experiences and argue for the absence of such permanent consciousness and 
identity (Flanagan 2002, 2011). Likewise, the Cārvaka system proposes 
that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenal product of insentient 
matter, in which case “the Cārvaka perspective is especially significant in the 
modern context as it readily accommodates a Darwinian or Neo-Darwinian 
understanding of the universe with little or no need of theological or 
philosophical negotiation. As N. S. Dravid notes, the Cārvaka perspective 
‘is more or less the modern scientific view of the purely physico-chemical 
structure of the human body’” (Brown 2012, 24–25). In the absence of any 
truly uncontested evidence, it is simply not the case that dream analogies 
and phenomenological subjectivity unequivocally attest to what Edelmann 
and Vaishnava theology claim. What is more, I believe our current scientific 
theories regarding such matters are much more parsimonious. 
Consciousness for most Hindus—both classical and contemporary— 
cannot be reduced to the material (Brown  2012).  That  was  clearly 
what Patañjali had, and yogis today have, in mind. On an emotional 
level, this is clearly understandable. Disembodied or disembodiable minds 
are existentially soothing. Of course, existential satisfaction cannot truly 
comment on ontological  viability.  Most  philosophers  of  mind,  not 
to mention neuropsychologists and neuroscientists, are thoroughgoing 
physicalists (Dennett 1991; Kim 2005; Searle 2005; Koch 2004; Flanagan 
2002; Churchland 1988; Thagaard 2010). Outside of wishful thinking, 
there just does not appear at present any truly compelling reason to 
believe otherwise. Emotional appeals and certain unsubstantiated, first- 
person declarations notwithstanding, consciousness does not seem capable 
of existing “outside” an appropriate physical medium. The notion that 
consciousness not only somehow exists free of a such medium but is also 
capable of realizing its intentions immediately is similarly something for 
which we have no evidence, experiential or otherwise, or rational reason to 
believe (Mackie 1982). Every experience we have with anything conscious 
involves physical mediation from start to finish. Indeed, “it becomes hard 
to think of a disembodied will that is an uncaused cause—after all, our 
own minds are nothing of the sort” (Edis 2008, 124). If the brain is 
properly functioning, we can expect consciousness to be present. If the 
brain is damaged, consciousness is similarly affected. If the brain is dead, 
consciousness is not. Despite religio-poetic attestations to the contrary, 
the mind is the brain and the brain is wholly material. Fortunately or 
unfortunately, proclaiming the physicality of mind does not put to rest all 
of the fantastic speculations regarding the nature of consciousness; after 
all, quantum mechanics is part of advanced physical theory today. 
The complexities and confusions attending quantum mechanics would 
seem to invite all sorts of intellectual misdemeanors with respect to 
consciousness. Although we may presently suspend judgment on just 
how important quantum mechanics may be for consciousness, the pop 
 
 
quantum theorizing we find amid the Neo-Hindu and so-called “new age” 
communities is not only unwarranted but wholly unpersuasive (Brown 
2012). I believe Stenger is correct when he writes: 
The brain is not a quantum device. It operates for the most part according 
to Newtonian mechanics. The  fact  that  the  atoms  in  the  brain  operate 
on quantum principles  does  not  change  this  conclusion.  So  do  the  atoms 
of a rock, and we are not  considering  rock  consciousness.  Most  of  the 
time the brain is “just” a computer carrying out deterministic mechanical 
algorithms in which a given input should always result in the same output. 
(2009, 195) 
Determinism does seem to be gaining ground (Harris 2012). Of course, 
certain Hindu traditions may want to contest Stenger’s preclusion of rock 
consciousness. Advaita Vedānta, for instance, may support some sort of 
“weak theory of rock consciousness.” If Brahman pervades all things or, 
and better yet, is ultimately all things, then consciousness animates the 
entire cosmos. As it is with Patañjali’s queer ontology, so too with Advaita 
Vedānta’s: outside of wishful thinking, the Vedāntic position appears 
scientifically and philosophically unwarranted. 
If the contemporary scientific image is the most empirico-rationally 
warranted position to endorse, can we chalk up its opposite—namely the 
humanistic image (Flanagan 2002)—simply to emotional appeal? I don’t 
believe so. Emotional appeal is starting to look like only one side of a 
more complicated coin. For good or ill, the other side may be even more 
troubling for religious communities. 
Over the past couple of decades, great strides have been made in the 
cognitive sciences. Particular to our discussion, the cognitive science of 
religion (CSR) has begun to highlight our natural, cognitive proclivities to 
interpret information in rather peculiar ways. While classical psychology 
of religion was wont to highlight the emotional motivations for living 
the religious life, we are now coming to understand that such emotional 
satisfactions find their complement and ultimately support in the cognitive 
ease with which we come to believe in disembodied minds (Bloom 2004). 
Cognitive science of religion indicates that religious belief, behavior, and 
experience are quite natural for the type of animal we are. Science, curiously 
enough, appears to be quite unnatural (McCauley 2011). Employing the 
language of maturation, McCauley, for instance, notes that there are two 
types of cognitive activity. One type comes to us quite naturally and matures 
naturally; the other takes some time and effort to master—that is to say, 
the other takes some practice. The reason for this is that the practiced 
type of cognition runs against the grain of the maturationally natural one. 
So-called practiced naturalness often results in thoroughly counterintuitive 
arguments and ultimately realizations. Science represents the pinnacle, so 
far, of practiced naturalness. 
 
 
Maturationally natural cognition reflects the evolutionary history of 
the human animal. The psychological proclivities associated with such 
cognition appear to be solutions to specific adaptive problems in what 
some call the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA (Tooby 
and Cosmides 1992). This environment is not merely a description of the 
flora and fauna of a particular geographical region; rather, it comprises the 
statistically significant recurrence of specific problems any one species faced 
and faces in its attempts to mature to reproductive fitness, to engage in 
successful reproduction, and to nurture progeny to reproductive maturity 
and success. 
Specific to the human animal’s struggle to survive and reproduce was 
and continues to be its particularly weak and slow physicality: our ancestors 
would have been and most likely were easily overtaken by faster and stronger 
animals—for instance, big cats and packs of dogs (Barrett 2005). The 
primary means for fending off such reproductive threats was sociality. Our 
ancestors had to band together and share information in order to survive. 
For this reason, they came to inhabit what Boyer calls “the cognitive niche” 
(2001, 120). Success in this particular niche required that our ancestors 
form the ability to infer that certain objects behave according to internally 
generated motivations—that is, some objects turn out to be agents. In 
order to infer the presence of agents, our ancestors developed a particular 
psychological capacity known today as a “theory of mind.” Our theory of 
mind (ToM) enables us to take up the “intentional stance” as opposed to 
the “design stance” (Dennett 1989). Because of the intentional stance, we 
are able to interpret the behavior of certain objects as the result of internally 
generated desires, hopes, and intentions. This was crucial to our ancestors’ 
survival. Insofar as other sentient objects, or agents, were vital not only to 
our survival but also our potential demise, our species eventually developed 
a trip-wired capacity to attribute agency where there in fact may be none. 
This trip-wired function has been called the “hyperactive agency detection 
device,” or HADD (Barrett 2004). 
Though a survival advantage for our ancestors—and maybe still for us 
today—the HADD leads us to commit many Type I errors. Type I errors 
pertain to sensing patterns where patterns do not exist, an error resting 
on the same spectrum with apophenia and schizophrenia. It is not, of 
course, hard to recognize the survival advantage of this cognitive error. A 
redeployed Pascalian wager proves the point: it always makes good survival 
sense to bet, under conditions of perceptual ambiguity to be sure, that 
something is an agent or the result of agent causation rather than the 
other way around. For instance, if you are not sure that the dark “blob” 
off the hiking trail ahead is a boulder or a bear, you should probably bet 
it is a bear first (Guthrie 1993). This is precisely what we do: we bet on 
agency far more often than not. Insofar as this is the case, we tend to 
 
 
socialize nonsocial realities. Who hasn’t at some point cursed a computer 
that crashes or pleaded with a car that will not start? Socially cajoling 
insentient objects is a mistake. Accordingly, we either enjoy or suffer from 
a hypertrophied social intelligence (Boyer 2001, 122). 
Our promiscuous social psychology constitutes what McCauley calls 
maturationally natural cognition. We sense agents everywhere, and we 
default to agent causation more often than not when engaged in 
explanatory tasks. We are indeed most fond of asking questions of this 
sort: “Who made/did X?” as opposed to “What made/did X?” Narrative 
explanations dealing with agents and intentions appear far more satisfying, 
especially when  we broach  some of  the more  meaningful existential 
questions pertaining to cosmogony and anthropology (Keleman 2004). 
Despite the fact that we have had no experience of the disembodied minds 
to which religions continually attest, our psychological proclivities appear 
to get the best of us most of the time. McCauley rightly notes, “Narrative 
activation of theory of mind systems can imbue an utterly improbable chain 
of events with a plausibility and fascination that human minds not only 
find engaging but convincing” (2011, 186). Here’s the catch. We know 
that our social psychological intuitions get it wrong. How, then, in the 
absence of any empirical evidence, can we be sure that religion is not at 
the end of the day one grand Type I error—that is, cognitive illusion? We 
cannot. This leads me to believe that it in fact is a cognitive illusion. I 
further believe this is the case with the dharma traditions of South Asia. 
Yogic perception results from the promiscuity of our social psychology in 
general and our theory of mind in particular. Herein rests the cognitive 
distinction between religion and science. 
The religion and science affair is ultimately a discussion concerning 
the rationally warranted range and scope of attributions  involving 
agents and agent causation. Indeed, “scientific abstemiousness regarding 
intentional agents and their putative actions is to be compared with. . . 
religions’ pervasive recruitment of theory of  mind  and  appeals  to 
agent explanations”(McCauley 2011, 232). Religious traditions and the 
theologies that eventually develop therefrom presume the preeminence of 
mind over matter and as such are committed to, at the very least, substance 
dualism, and quite often with the Hindu traditions, idealistic monism. 
Either way, consciousness is irreducible to material reality (Brown 2012). 
Fortunately or unfortunately, the overwhelming consensus in the mind 
sciences today indicates that both substance dualism and idealistic monism 
are incorrect. When Edelmann suggests that the Bhāgavata tradition 
need not worry about the mind-body dilemma so endemic to Western 
philosophical debates, he does so on the premise that the Hindu traditions 
understand that mind and body are part of a larger genre of material reality 
(prak.rti) and that consciousness (puru.sa) is separate from such reality. This 
position, however, is based solely on first person testimony, which once 
 
 
again amounts to nothing more than anecdote. What is more, accepting 
first-person testimony would seem to overlook a truism in the sciences 
today: 
Believers, like human beings generally, have no automatic, privileged, incorrigible 
entrée to the true nature of their behavior. The fact that they are the subject of 
their behavior is almost coincidental. It scarcely entails that they are the best, let 
alone sole, judge of it. Their own view may in fact prove the correct one, but not 
simply because it is their view. (Segal 1983, 114) 
The theology that follows fares no better. To be sure, “modern science’s 
challenge to spiritual beliefs cannot be avoided by philosophical maneuvers” 
(Edis 2008, 125). Theology’s disputatious obfuscations amount to nothing 
more than such philosophical maneuvers. There is simply no supporting 
evidence for the theological positions of the Bhāgavata Purān. a. 
I do not believe there is anything the Bhāgavata Purān. a has to offer 
contemporary biological theory. Insofar as the Hindu traditions indulge 
our hypertrophied social intelligence, they seem presently unfit for dialogue 
with any of the natural sciences. The indisputable, cumulative, practical 
success of the natural sciences suggests that the inference to the best 
explanation for such success is that physicalism is in fact true. Despite 
metaphysical intuitions to the contrary, consciousness appears to be a 
property of a very complex, physical system. When that physical system 
deteriorates—as all physical systems eventually do—then consciousness 
deteriorates with it. It would seem the time is nigh to recognize that our 
intentional stance is simply mistaken when it comes to explaining and 
understanding the physical, chemical, and biological worlds. The design 
stance at the heart of the scientific enterprise holds out the best hope for 
our understanding of what is true and for realizing what is illusory. In 
this regard, a mature Indology must follow Wiebe’s counsel concerning a 
mature science of religion: 
A science of religion . . . is not an autonomous enterprise that is ultimately free 
from the constraints of the other sciences but must rather recognize them as 
constituting “boundary conditions” that affect the range of theories of religion 
reasonably open to the Religious Studies enterprise. That is, those theories will 
have to locate themselves within what might be called an “integrated causal model” 
of the sciences and, consequently, will be “reductionistic” in that they will attempt 
to explain “the supernatural” naturalistically. All explanatory work and theoretical 
accounts of religion within the Religious Studies framework, therefore, will have 
to fall within the same conceptual and causal framework used to explain all other 
elements and aspects of the natural and social worlds. (2006, 691–92) 
The same indeed holds for Indology: any theory pertaining to data 
issuing from the South Asian subcontinent must be constrained by the 
conceptual and causal frameworks of the natural and social sciences. 
Although many Indologists may be hesitant to accept this, it is the future of 
Indology. Appeals to take seriously indigenous philosophy and theology are 
 
 
simply unconvincing. Until there is some extraordinary evidence for what 
remains interminably anecdotal “evidence,” I see no consilience between 
Hinduism’s yogic perceptions and science as we now know it. Accordingly, 
and to paraphrase Mark C. Taylor, it would appear that Bhāgavata theology 
is as dead as the Vishnu for which it searches. 
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